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1. Introduction 
Economic, demographic and socio-ecological developments have triggered and will 
continue to lead to labour market reforms in many European countries. Hence, how to 
organise the labour market is one of the key public policy issues of today. In policy 
debates, the most important concepts seem to be ‘flexicurity’ and the ‘transitional 
labour market’ (TLM). In this position paper, we conceptualise the models of 
flexicurity and the transitional labour market, and raise potentially relevant research 
questions. This provides a basis for the empirical analyses that will be carried out in 
the research papers to be delivered as part of Work Package 6.  
Flexicurity refers to a combination of loose employment protection legislation (EPL), 
generous unemployment benefits and strong efforts on active labour market policies 
(ALMPs). The scholarly attention on this labour market model has been mainly 
theoretical and conceptually oriented. It is less clear to what extent labour market 
policy reforms along the lines of the flexicurity concept have actually been 
implemented across European Union countries and which factors can explain the 
variation in these policy reforms across countries and over time. These issues are 
addressed in section 2. Subsequently, we discuss the outcomes of these measures in 
terms of transitions on the labour market in section 3. The TLM model can be used to 
analyse transitions that individuals make during their life course, such as from 
unemployment to employment, from employment to employment and from 
employment to unemployment. We argue that the concept of the TLM model can be 
developed in more detail when a number of empirical questions are answered. In 
section 4, we present descriptive statistics for a number of labour market outcomes, 
such as long-term employment. Furthermore, we discuss other effects that labour 
market policies – and in particular EPL – are likely to have, namely on innovation and 
the adoption of new technologies. These points are illustrated with descriptive 
statistical analyses. Finally, a number of directions for further research are outlined in 
section 5.  
2. Flexicurity policies 
2.1 The concept of flexicurity 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, flexicurity has been a main concept in European 
labour market reform. At the EU level, the concept is integrated in the European 
employment strategy, which is aimed at increasing employment and reducing 
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unemployment in EU countries. In addition, among policy-makers flexicurity is 
considered an important way to enhance Europe’s economic growth and social 
cohesion (e.g. European Commission, 2006, 2007a and 2007b; Boeri et al., 2007). More 
flexible labour markets would improve Europe’s competitiveness owing to the lower 
costs for firms to adjust to the dynamics of the highly integrated international 
economy. Increased labour participation and higher income security contribute to 
higher levels of social inclusion. As such, flexicurity is expected to contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
The main characteristic of flexicurity is that it is intended to overcome the tensions 
between labour market flexibility on the one hand, and the provision of social security 
for workers on the other hand (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). Flexible labour markets can 
be seen as beneficial for job creation, especially during periods of recovery after 
recessions, but they also involve lower levels of economic security. Welfare state 
programmes provide economic security, but they generate unintended effects, such as 
longer unemployment spells and therefore higher public expenditure and less mobility 
on the labour market. In the flexicurity concept, flexibility and security are viewed as 
complementary.   
In the literature, the term ‘flexicurity’ has been used to refer to different configurations 
of labour market policies, in which several types and degrees of flexibility (external 
and internal numerical, functional and wage) and security (job, employment and 
income) have been stressed (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Madsen, 2007; Viebrock and 
Clasen, 2009). In the often-mentioned examples of flexicurity policies in reality, namely 
those in Denmark and the Netherlands, there is variation too. The Danish model of 
flexicurity builds on the combination of flexible labour markets, generous 
unemployment benefits and a strong emphasis on activation. This combination is 
known as the ‘golden triangle’. The Dutch flexicurity model is more centred on 
combining non-standard work, such as temporary agency work and part-time work, 
with regular social security rights (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). Because the Danish 
model is most used to illustrate the concept of flexicurity in the literature and in EU 
employment guidelines and policy documents, we focus on the labour market policies 
of the Danish type of flexicurity. This is a combination of three types of labour market 
policies. First, employment protection legislation that is relatively loose provides 
flexibility for firms in terms of the hiring and firing of workers. This is compensated by 
a rather generous social safety net for the unemployed through unemployment 
benefits, which is the second element, income security. Indeed, the exchange between 
employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits can be regarded as the 
main axis of flexicurity. Economists usually concentrate on the trade-off between 
unemployment benefits and employment protection (see e.g. Boeri et al., 2006). Third, 
flexicurity involves strong efforts on active labour market policies. When low 
employment protection leads to more dismissals, the mobility on the labour market 
will be greater when the skills of the unemployed are improved by training. Thus, 
transitions from unemployment to employment can be made easier, leading to 
employment security. As a result, job security is replaced by employment security, 
which is a central feature of the flexicurity concept. 
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2.2 The political economy of flexicurity policies 
Compared with the amount of conceptual and theoretical work, there is relatively little 
empirical research on flexicurity. Besides the typical examples of Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which have been extensively discussed in the literature, there is little 
insight into the extent to which labour market policies have been reformed along the 
lines of the flexicurity concept in other European countries. This is quite remarkable 
because flexicurity has been considered a successful reform strategy. Since a reform 
proposal consists of a package of policies rather than a single labour market policy, it is 
expected to overcome opposition from employees in reform processes more easily 
(Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2005). Lower levels of employment protection may be 
compensated by more generous unemployment benefits and activation programmes. 
Hence, social partners are seen as important actors in the policy-making process of 
flexicurity policies (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009).  
With respect to the effect of the degree of corporatism on labour market policies, there 
are generally two theoretical arguments. The first argument builds on the insider–
outsider approach (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). In this view, insiders can be defined 
as incumbent workers who have privileges. The other part of the labour force consists 
of outsiders. Although insiders can differ from outsiders in many ways, insiders can 
generally be conceptualised as employees with permanent contracts who are labour 
union members, whereas outsiders are workers with fixed-term contracts who are not 
represented by labour unions. Therefore, labour unions are supposed to act in favour 
of the insiders. In this perspective, unions are in favour of high levels of EPL, but they 
oppose strong efforts on activation. ALMPs diminish the advantageous position of 
insiders relative to outsiders, because ALMPs improve the competitiveness of 
outsiders. According to the second argument, social partners act in favour of the 
interests of society as a whole. This approach has been called the ‘Olsonian’ approach 
to corporatism, after Mancur Olson (Rueda, 2007). In this theoretical perspective, both 
labour unions and employer organisations have incentives to maintain the reputation 
of being reasonable and representative (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). Under this 
approach, labour unions are supposed to support generous social policies and strong 
efforts on activation. To date, there is not much empirical research on the 
implementation of the whole flexicurity model and the role of social partners, but there 
is more empirical research on the policy instruments that are the pillars of flexicurity, 
namely employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits and ALMPs. 
Rueda (2007) examined the variations in EPL across countries and over time, but he did 
not find a clear effect of corporatism. Emmenegger (2011) used a fuzzy set approach to 
analyse the cross-country variation in EPL and he found that a strong labour 
movement leads to more EPL.1 It is not clear, however, whether this stems from labour 
unions or from left-wing political parties, since the index that has been used in this 
study comprises both. This is notable, since in many other studies both types of actors 
are included separately. Moreover, sometimes the issue examined is whether there is 
an interaction effect between the two types of actors in the policy-making process. 
Remarkably, these studies did not account for the differences in EPL with respect to 
workers with permanent or temporary contracts. It has been well documented that EPL 
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reforms have regularly resulted in two-tier reforms, in which the employment 
protection for temporary contracts has been reduced, while the employment protection 
for permanent contracts has remained unchanged (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Ochel, 
2008; Nijboer and Van Vliet, 2009). Since insiders, employees with a permanent 
contract, are better organised and have access to political decision-making, through for 
instance tripartite institutions, they have been able to exert veto power during reforms. 
Hence, policy-makers have only succeeded in reforming EPL on temporary contracts. 
Interestingly, Eichhorst and Marx (2011) have argued recently that insiders may react 
to more flexibility for temporary jobs with more flexibility in their own segment in 
order to strengthen their competitiveness relative to flexible workers.  
With respect to unemployment benefits, significant progress has been made in the 
measures for international comparative research. Building on the idea of the 
unemployment benefit replacement rates provided by the OECD (2010), Scruggs (2005) 
came up with the “Welfare state entitlements data set”, in which more refined 
measures are provided. These data were analysed by Allan and Scruggs (2004). Their 
results suggest that corporatism is positively associated with the levels of 
unemployment benefits. Formulated differently, the authors interpret these findings as 
being consistent with the view that strong unions and policy concertation tend to resist 
retrenchment, or retrench less. Analysing the impact of corporatism on the expenditure 
on unemployment benefits, Rueda (2007) did not find any direct effect of corporatism, 
but he found an interaction effect. When the level of corporatism is low, left-wing 
political parties yield a positive effect, while they do not in the case of a corporatist 
tradition of policy-making. Swank (2011) examines the impact of corporatism on the 
spending on unemployment benefits as well as Scruggs’s income replacement rate for 
unemployment benefits and he found for both measures a positive impact of 
corporatism. 
Over the course of time, the amount of empirical work on ALMPs has grown steadily 
and so has the insight into the role of corporatism. Martin and Swank (2004) found that 
corporatist policy-making is strongly associated with shares of national income 
devoted to ALMPs. More recently, Swank (2011) found that political-economic 
institutions of (sector-) coordinated capitalism have a positive impact on spending on 
ALMPs. In line with these results, Van Vliet and Koster (2011) find a positive effect of 
the presence of tripartite councils on ALMP expenditure. Relying on fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analyses, Vis (2011) qualifies the picture. She finds that in 
combination with rightist governments the presence of corporatism leads to higher 
spending on activation, while in the case of leftist governments, it is the absence of 
corporatism that leads to higher activation spending.  
In summary, social partners play an important role in the implementation of flexicurity 
policies. The question is under what political-economic conditions the flexicurity 
model, in terms of a combination of flexible labour markets, generous unemployment 
benefits and a strong emphasis on ALMPs, becomes feasible. The synopsis of the 
literature presented above reveals that the overall picture seems to be a complicated 
one. A corporatist tradition of policy-making is related to high levels of EPL, generous 
unemployment support and strong efforts on ALMPs. More research is needed to find 
out whether and under what conditions reforms in the direction of the flexicurity 
model are feasible. Naturally, factors other than corporatism should be taken into 
account as well. 
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2.3 Interaction between labour market policies 
The interaction between different labour-market policy instruments is an important 
factor in policy reforms. A single labour-market policy instrument is embedded in a 
large number of welfare state institutions in a country. This has conventionally been 
taken into account in the welfare regime literature in which welfare states are regarded 
and conceptualised as configurations of various policy instruments (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Yet in the comparative political-economy literature that deals with explanations 
for the variations in welfare state reforms across countries and over time, welfare state 
institutions are generally treated as isolated policy instruments. Most studies focus on 
a single policy instrument, for instance unemployment benefits, and the 
interrelationships with other policies such as EPL are not addressed. Still, this 
especially applies to quantitatively oriented studies in the comparative political-
economy literature. After all, in case studies a broader context is usually taken into 
account.2 One quantitative study that actually does include other labour market 
policies is that by Rueda (2007). In empirical models on expenditure on active and 
passive labour market policies, employment protection is included as an independent 
variable. The interaction between policy instruments is especially important in the case 
of flexicurity, since the key idea is that more income security will compensate the 
increased flexibility in employment protection. As a consequence, opposition from 
insiders could be overcome (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2005). 
2.4 Focus on OECD countries 
From an empirical viewpoint, most studies include Western OECD countries from the 
early 1980s to the early 2000s, which can probably be attributed to data availability. 
Although the new member states of the EU are also expected to implement flexicurity 
policies, they have not been included in the empirical literature on flexicurity. This 
raises the question of whether the findings in the existing comparative political-
economy literature with respect to the explanations for the variation in the reforms of 
flexicurity policy instruments across countries and over time also hold for the new 
member states of the EU. After all, there is strong evidence that welfare state 
institutions and employment relations in Western European countries differ 
fundamentally from those institutions in Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) (Draxler and Van Vliet, 2010). In addition, the labour market situation itself is 
challenging in the CEECs, given the high proportion of non-active persons of working 
age who are receiving long-term benefits with few activation incentives, in 
combination with low productivity and large numbers of informal sector workers 
(Viebrock and Clasen, 2009, p. 311). 
3. The transitional labour market model 
The concept of the TLM was introduced by Schmid in the 1990s (Schmid, 1998). An 
important argument starting the discussion about the TLM model was that traditional 
models had not led to full employment. According to Schmid’s analysis, this is partly 
                                                     
2 In quantitatively oriented studies, typically based on pooled time series cross-section 
regression analyses, country fixed effects are often included to control for other welfare state 
institutions. Hence, it is implicitly assumed that these welfare state institutions do not change 
over the course of time. This assumption does not seem very realistic.  
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because of the fact that labour markets are social institutions rather than commodity 
markets and thus need much more government intervention to run smoothly. Another 
reason for failing labour market models is that the world itself has changed, for 
example owing to globalisation, changing lifestyles and changes in household 
composition, and therefore the old models no longer suffice. As such, the underlying 
logic of the TLM closely relates to concepts concerning old and new (manufactured) 
risks (Beck, 1992; Pierson, 1996; Taylor-Gooby, 2004), active labour market policies 
(Calmfors, 1994) and labour market flexibility (Atkinson, 1984). 
The TLM model offers a broad view of possible transitions that individuals may make 
during their life course. These individuals can be in different states between these 
transitions. These states are education, employment, household work, unemployment 
and retirement. Combining these states results in the following six potential transitions 
in which employment has a central place: 
1. Education – employment 
Before people decide whether to participate in the labour market, they will spend 
a certain amount of time in education. After receiving a certain degree, a large 
share tries to find a job. The transition from education to employment mostly 
centres around questions concerning the position of youth on the labour market. 
2. Unemployment – employment 
Whenever people are unfortunate enough to become unemployed, most of them 
try to find employment again. Here questions of labour market activation, 
welfare state dependence and individual work motivation play an important 
role. Furthermore, the ease of hiring someone is a relevant issue from the point of 
view of employees. 
3. Household – employment 
Those doing household work may decide to become active after a while. This 
may be the case when young children grow up and leave the house or when 
household members decide to rearrange their household division of labour. A 
major question in this respect is how people deal with human capital investments 
and the extent to which individuals are supported in such investments. 
4. Employment – employment 
Being active on the labour market does not necessarily mean that individuals are 
employed at the same place for their entire working life. Instead, they will move 
from one employer to another if that improves their position. In this regard, the 
main question is how easily people can move from one organisation to another. 
5. Employment – unemployment 
There may be different reasons for transitions from employment to 
unemployment. An important question here is how easily organisations can fire 
employees, which mainly results from institutional arrangements, such as the 
level of employment protection in a country. 
6. Employment – retirement 
Finally, people will move out of the labour market and into retirement. A 
plethora of factors at the institutional, organisational and individual levels 
influence the decision to retire. 
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With regard to the empirical state of the art of the TLM model, there is partly evidence 
on the ease of transitions in different countries (see for example Lassnigg (2005), who 
describes that evidence with regard to transitions from education to employment). 
Gathering a full account of the model requires integrating the distinct strands of 
literature into a single analysis. Such an approach will also seek to answer a number of 
questions that have not been resolved to date. 
3.1 Distinguishing states 
Conceptually, the TLM model builds on clearly distinguishable states and the 
transitions between these states. It is of both theoretical and empirical interest to 
investigate the extent to which the model holds in reality. It is very likely that 
individuals combine states rather than move from one to another. People doing 
household work can combine it with paid work and individuals can choose partial 
retirement instead of moving out of the labour market completely. Indeed, as this does 
not require clear-cut transitions but the ability to fulfil different roles, being 
multifunctional may increase the level of flexibility as well as the level of security. 
3.2 Degree of change 
Empirically, the question to be answered is how much change there actually is, since 
the model assumes that structural changes in the labour market force governments to 
leave old models behind and look for new solutions to the problems of today. 
Nevertheless, as long as these changes are only taken for granted and not considered 
critically themselves, these models run the danger of providing solutions for 
nonexistent problems. 
3.3 Important actors 
A final conceptual matter that is not discussed in the TLM context concerns the 
division of responsibilities and the ultimate outcomes of the model. Should the model 
contribute to full employment, to material wealth or perhaps to other, non-monetary 
policy goals like happiness? As it is now, the model is formulated from a policy point 
of view, with certain policy goals in mind. These goals have to be clarified to evaluate 
the state of the model. Furthermore, this also requires a better understanding of which 
actors are involved in the outcomes. At present, the main actors in the model seem to 
be policy-makers and individuals. Yet for the model to function smoothly the demand-
side perspective also needs to be understood. Therefore, the behaviour of employers 
and organisations needs to be incorporated. Including these actors would enable us to 
say how the model works and for whom. 
The conceptual discussion concerning the TLM shows that the concept is a mixture of 
the actual state of the economy and the labour market, the selected policy goals, views 
towards government intervention, and the preferences of individual and corporate 
actors concerning the demand and supply of labour. Fully understanding how and to 
what extent the TLM works and how it differs across countries requires insight into 
how the underlying aspects come into play. Hence, taking a myriad of factors into  
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account is required. First, as the TLM focuses on transitions on the labour market, the 
question is how easily people move from one state to another (for example, from 
unemployment to employment). As long as these transitions run smoothly there is 
little need for government intervention with regard to supporting these transitions. But 
if countries do face labour inflexibility, the question remains of what causes these 
rigidities. Are they, for example, the result of market failures, problems concerning 
market demand in certain economic sectors or inadequate institutions? Second, if a 
government recognises that there may be issues with regard to the labour market, the 
question is whether it will choose to intervene, which is closely related to how much 
leeway it is granted given public opinion and the ideological position of key actors. 
Still, even if governments choose to intervene, it is not clear beforehand the degree to 
which measures based on the TLM will be adopted. Finally, the functioning of the 
labour market not only refers to the way and the ease with which demand and supply 
meet one another on the labour market, but also to the preferences of organisations and 
individuals. With regard to labour market flexibility, organisations are mainly 
interested in rightsizing their workforce, gaining easy access to the human capital they 
require at a certain point in time. These preferences, however, do not necessarily match 
those of individuals supplying labour. Both economic necessity and cultural norms 
may be relevant underlying mechanisms here. 
4. Trends and patterns 
4.1 Trends and regulations related to TLM 
In the conceptual discussion of TLM, we pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish 
among various factors, namely the actual labour situation in a country, government 
policies and individual preferences. Applying these distinctions, we next discuss a 
number of country differences.  
Labour market situation 
The actual transitions on the labour market can be evaluated using different indices 
about unemployment and exit from the labour market in terms of retirement. The level 
of unemployment shows how good or bad the labour market functions as a whole 
(Table 1). In addition, the level of long-term unemployment indicates how well the 
labour market is able to absorb labour market changes in the longer run (Table 2). 
Finally, the average exit age indicates when people make the transition from work to 
retirement (Table 3).  
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Table 1. Unemployment rate (%) per country, 2000–10 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Austria 3.6 4.2 4.9 4.8 3.8 4.4 
Belgium 6.9 7.5 8.4 8.3 7 8.3 
Bulgaria 16.4 18.2 12.1 9 5.6 10.2 
Cyprus 4.9 3.6 4.7 4.6 3.6 6.3 
Czech Republic 8.7 7.3 8.3 7.2 4.4 7.3 
Denmark 4.3 4.6 5.5 3.9 3.3 7.4 
Estonia 13.6 10.3 9.7 5.9 5.5 16.9 
Finland 9.8 9.1 8.8 7.7 6.4 8.4 
France 9 8.6 9.3 9.2 7.8 9.8 
Germany  7.5 8.4 9.8 10.3 7.5 7.1 
Greece 11.2 10.3 10.5 8.9 7.7 12.6 
Hungary 6.4 5.8 6.1 7.5 7.8 11.2 
Ireland 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 6.3 13.7 
Italy 10.1 8.6 8 6.8 6.7 8.4 
Japan 4.7 5.4 4.7 4.1 4 5.1 
Latvia 13.7 12.2 10.4 6.8 7.5 18.7 
Lithuania 16.4 13.5 11.4 5.6 5.8 17.8 
Luxembourg 2.2 2.6 5 4.6 4.9 4.5 
Malta 6.7 7.5 7.4 7.1 5.9 6.9 
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 5.1 4.4 3.1 4.5 
Norway 3.2 3.7 4.3 3.4 2.5 3.5 
Poland 16.1 20 19 13.9 7.1 9.6 
Portugal 4.5 5.7 7.5 8.6 8.5 12 
Romania 7.3 8.6 8.1 7.3 5.8 7.3 
Slovakia 18.8 18.7 18.2 13.4 9.5 14.4 
Slovenia 6.7 6.3 6.3 6 4.4 7.3 
Spain 11.1 11.1 10.6 8.5 11.3 20.1 
Sweden 5.6 6 7.4 7.1 6.2 8.4 
UK 5.4 5.1 4.7 5.4 5.6 7.8 
US 4 5.8 5.5 4.6 5.8 9.6 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
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Table 2. Long-term unemployment (%), 2000–10 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Austria 1 1.1 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.1 
Belgium 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.2 3.3 4.1 
Bulgaria 9.4 12 7.2 5 2.9 4.8 
Cyprus 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.5 1.3 
Czech Republic 4.2 3.7 4.2 3.9 2.2 3 
Denmark 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.4 1.4 
Estonia 6.3 5.4 5 2.9 1.7 7.7 
Finland 2.8 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.2 2 
France 3.5 3 3.8 3.9 2.9 3.9 
Germany  3.8 4 5.5 5.8 4 3.4 
Greece 6.2 5.3 5.6 4.8 3.6 5.7 
Hungary 3.1 2.5 2.7 3.4 3.6 5.5 
Ireland 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.7 6.7 
Italy 6.3 5.1 4 3.4 3.1 4.1 
Japan 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.9 
Latvia 7.9 5.5 4.6 2.5 1.9 8.4 
Lithuania 8 7.2 5.8 2.5 1.2 7.4 
Luxembourg 0.5 0.7 1 1.4 1.6 1.3 
Malta 4.5 3.2 3.4 2.8 2.5 3.2 
Netherlands 0.8 0.8 1.7 1.9 1.1 1.2 
Norway 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7 
Poland 7.4 10.9 10.3 7.8 2.4 3 
Romania 3.8 4.6 4.8 4.2 2.4 2.5 
Slovakia 10.3 12.2 11.8 10.2 6.6 9.2 
Slovenia 4.1 3.5 3.2 2.9 1.9 3.2 
Spain 4.6 3.7 3.4 1.8 2 7.3 
Sweden 1.4 1.2 1.4 1 0.8 1.5 
UK 1.4 1.1 1 1.2 1.4 2.5 
US 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6 2.8 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
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Table 3. Average exit age from the labour force, 2001–09 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 59.2 58.8 59.9 60.9 – – 
Belgium 56.8 58.7 60.6 61.6 – – 
Bulgaria – 58.7 60.2 – – – 
Cyprus 62.3 62.7 – 63.5 – 62.8 
Czech Republic 58.9 60.1 60.6 60.7 60.6 60.5 
Denmark 61.6 62.2 61 60.6 61.3 62.3 
Estonia 61.1 60.8 61.7 62.5 62.1 62.6 
Finland 61.4 60.4 61.7 61.6 – 61.7 
France 58.1 60 59 59.4 59.3 60 
Germany  60.6 61.6 – 62 61.7 62.2 
Greece – 62.7 61.7 61 61.4 61.5 
Hungary 57.6 61.6 59.8 – – 59.3 
Ireland 63.2 62.9 64.1 – – – 
Italy 59.8 61 59.7 60.4 60.8 60.1 
Latvia 62.4 – 62.1 63.3 62.7 – 
Lithuania 58.9 – 60 – – – 
Luxembourg 56.8 57.4 59.4 – – – 
Malta 57.6 58.8 58.8 – 59.8 60.3 
Netherlands 60.9 60.5 61.5 63.9 63.2 63.5 
Norway 63.3 62.8 63.1 64.4 64 63.2 
Poland 56.6 57.9 59.5 59.3 – – 
Portugal 61.9 62.1 63.1 62.6 – – 
Romania 59.8 62.7 63 – – – 
Slovakia 57.5 57.8 59.2 58.7 – 58.8 
Slovenia – 56.2 58.5 – – – 
Spain 60.3 61.5 62.4 62.1 62.6 62.3 
Sweden 62.1 63.1 63.6 63.9 63.8 64.3 
Switzerland 63.9 63 62.5 63.5 63.7 63.5 
UK 62 63 62.6 62.6 63.1 63 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
Government policies 
Active labour market policies are government policies that may help transitions on the 
labour market, from unemployment to employment, between jobs and from education 
to employment (see Table 4).  
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Table 4. ALMP expenditures (%), 1985–2005 
 ALMP as a share of LMP  ALMP per unemployed 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Australia 22.79 16.28 37.85 28.02 40.93  9.45 6.33 17.45 11.74 14.55 
Austria 23.36 25.82 22.76 35.56 35.43  17.55 21.39 20.84 30.16 24.71 
Belgium 26.42 27.56 27.28 27.66 24.47  22.85 29.85 22.14 35.83 29.01 
Canada 24.89 20.57 29.96 35.15 32.25  11.42 11.64 11.58 10.63 8.19 
Denmark – 15.11 30.10 40.24 38.23  – 15.83 50.69 82.50 66.20 
Finland 36.10 43.71 26.54 28.99 30.59  27.59 51.32 18.92 18.23 21.15 
France 20.54 30.20 42.42 45.12 34.44  14.87 20.43 26.47 30.88 22.43 
Germany 34.32 50.29 41.82 43.40 36.94  15.22 38.44 30.39 31.79 17.44 
Greece 32.97 31.52 49.44 37.44 14.41  5.00 6.64 9.98 5.11 1.59 
Ireland 23.98 38.55 42.61 54.71 41.40  16.99 21.56 27.28 45.36 27.37 
Italy – 27.76 27.84 58.26 53.57  – 4.76 5.74 12.86 17.33 
Japan – 50.38 37.71 31.66 43.12  – 30.53 18.90 11.23 11.04 
Luxembourg 33.83 30.23 21.60 34.07 34.34  58.19 36.79 11.17 16.06 24.05 
Netherlands 28.26 33.54 32.54 54.38 46.54  29.85 36.77 40.32 108.99 54.10 
New Zealand 58.80 31.73 37.32 26.63 47.22  50.15 22.38 21.57 16.12 19.42 
Norway 55.29 45.73 53.99 57.34 58.08  46.31 33.85 50.72 33.77 30.82 
Portugal – 60.45 34.58 48.07 –  – 21.30 14.80 30.30 17.26 
Spain 10.66 19.84 11.89 25.27 25.97  4.17 12.11 4.54 10.83 17.60 
Sweden 70.64 65.48 48.88 55.89 51.78  125.92 169.62 47.40 60.15 32.44 
Switzerland 43.36 65.85 30.57 52.04 44.47  40.12 79.80 24.08 36.73 29.69 
UK 25.29 43.69 32.09 51.04 67.26  12.77 16.27 9.96 12.79 22.37 
US 41.19 34.05 34.03 39.64 28.74  7.96 7.86 6.40 7.68 4.71 
Mean 34.04 36.74 34.26 41.39 39.53  28.69 31.61 22.33 29.99 23.34 
Definitions: i) ALMP as a share of LMP – ALMP expenditures as a share of expenditures on all labour market policies, defined as the sum of active and 
passive (unemployment benefits) spending  
ii) ALMP per unemployed – ALMP expenditures per unemployed person relative to GDP per capita 
Source: Van Vliet and Koster (2011). 
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Individual preferences 
The labour supply of individuals critically depends on the importance they attach to 
work. Over the years the centrality of work has been measured in international surveys 
(Table 5). In the World Values Survey 2005, work ethic was measured using the 
following five items: 1) to develop talents you need to have a job; 2) it is humiliating to 
receive money without having to work for it; 3) people who do not work turn lazy; 4) 
work is a duty towards society; and 5) work should always come first even if it means 
less spare time (answer categories range from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly 
agree” (5)) (World Values Survey Association, 2005).   
Table 5. Work centrality per country 
Australia 3.25 
Canada 3.22 
Chile 3.78 
Finland 3.34 
Germany 3.58 
Italy 3.67 
Japan 3.49 
Mexico 3.64 
Norway 3.52 
Poland 3.84 
Slovenia 3.70 
South Korea 3.86 
Spain 3.45 
Sweden 3.08 
Switzerland 3.48 
Turkey 4.16 
US 3.28 
Total 3.54 
Source: World Values Survey Association (2005). 
4.2 Employment protection legislation in the EU: Patterns and trends, 
1985–2008 
The strictness of the employment protection legislation has been measured with a 
number of indicators computed by the OECD following the methodology proposed by 
OECD (1999). These indicators capture the protection of regular employment and 
regulations on temporary work.  
Figure 1 shows the strictness of overall EPL in EU countries over the period 1985–2008. 
It appears that there is significant variation in the overall EPL across EU countries. The 
strictness of the EPL has decreased in countries where the EPL was the highest initially 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Sweden) and has slightly increased in the countries 
where EPL was the lowest (the UK and Ireland). This fact suggests a convergence trend 
of EPL across EU countries over the period analysed.     
Figures 2 and 3 show that a reduction in the strictness of EPL has taken place in most 
countries, particularly in the case of EPL for temporary contracts, with the exceptions 
of Ireland and the UK where the EPL for temporary contracts has increased slightly. 
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Figure 1. Overall employment protection legislation in EU countries, 1985–2008 
 
 
 
Definition: EPL is a composite measure of employment protection consisting of the strictness of 
regulation and dismissal for regular, temporary and collective dismissal.  
Data source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). 
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Figure 2. Employment protection for regular contracts (EPR) in EU countries, 1985–2008  
 
 
 
Definition: EPR is a sub-indicator for the dismissal of employees on regular contracts. This is 
calculated as a weighted sum of i) procedural inconveniences of individual dismissals on regular 
contracts, ii) notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissal and iii) the difficulty of 
dismissal. 
Data source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). 
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Figure 3. Employment protection for temporary contracts (EPT) in EU countries, 1985–2008 
 
 
 
Definition: EPT is a sub-indicator for the strictness of regulation on temporary contracts. This is 
calculated as a weighted sum of the strictness of regulation for i) temporary contracts and ii) fixed-
term contracts. 
Data source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). 
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4.3 The effects of EPL on innovation and the adoption of new technologies, 
1985–2008  
Employment protection legislation has been extensively analysed in relation to its 
effects on labour market performance, especially on employment and unemployment 
rates (Lazear, 1990; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; OECD, 2004; Nickell et al., 2005; 
Griffith et al., 2007). In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the impact 
of EPL on innovation, productivity and growth (Saint-Paul, 1997, 2002; Buchele and 
Christiansen, 1999; Akkermans et al., 2005; Acharya et al., 2009; Griffith and 
Macartney, 2010).  
In theory, the effects of EPL on innovation and the adoption of new technologies are 
ambiguous and existing empirical evidence is not clear-cut. On the one hand, EPL 
increases job security and may foster workers’ investment in innovation activities. On 
the other hand, EPL increases the adjustment costs firms face when they need to 
introduce technologically advanced innovations (Griffith and Macartney, 2010). Over 
the past two decades substantial policy reforms that liberalised product, labour and 
capital markets have been implemented in EU countries. Understanding how these 
policy reforms affect the decisions of firms to innovate and adopt new technologies is 
relevant for both research and policy-making in the context of the Europe 2020 
strategy.   
Figures 4 and 5 show that the relationship between innovation (using patent 
applications as a proxy) and EPL is non-linear, which suggests that it is conditioned by 
other factors, among which country characteristics are likely to play an important role. 
High levels of innovation performance are associated with both a low level of EPL (the 
UK) and a moderate level of EPL (Germany). Rigid EPL is associated with low 
innovation performance (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece). These are only partial 
correlations, however, and they do not capture the effects of other factors associated 
with innovation output, such as the level of development, human capital and the 
quality of institutions. To account for these factors an econometric analysis is 
necessary.    
Figures 6-8 show the relationship between employment protection legislation and the 
adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT) measured by three 
indicators: the share of ICT in GDP, the extent of Internet usage and broadband 
penetration. Again, this relationship appears to be non-linear, with the best 
performance in terms of ICT adoption being associated with a moderate level of 
employment protection legislation. 
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Figure 4. Employment protection legislation and innovation in EU countries (residents only), 1985–2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definitions: i) EPL is a composite measure of employment protection 
consisting of the strictness of regulation and dismissal for regular, 
temporary and collective dismissal. 
ii) Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent office for 
exclusive rights for an invention – a product or process that provides a new 
way of doing something or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A 
patent provides protection for the invention to the owner of the patent for a 
limited period, generally 20 years. 
Data sources: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx) and World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
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Figure 5. Employment protection legislation and innovation in EU countries (residents and non-residents), 1985–2008  
 
 
 
 
Definitions: i) EPL is a composite measure of employment protection 
consisting of the strictness of regulation and dismissal for regular, 
temporary and collective dismissal. 
ii) Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent office for 
exclusive rights for an invention – a product or process that provides a new 
way of doing something or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A 
patent provides protection for the invention to the owner of the patent for a 
limited period, generally 20 years. 
Data sources: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx) and World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
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Figure 6. Employment protection legislation and the share of the ICT sector in GDP, EU countries, 2008 
 
Definitions: i) EPL is a composite measure of employment protection consisting of the strictness of regulation and dismissal for regular, temporary and collective 
dismissal. 
ii) The share of the ICT sector as a percentage of GDP is measured as value added at factor cost in the ICT sector, as a percentage of total value added at factor 
cost. 
Data sources: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx) and Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat).  
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Figure 7. Employment protection legislation and Internet users, EU countries, 1997 and 2008 
 
 
 
Definitions: i) EPL is a composite measure of employment protection consisting of the strictness of 
regulation and dismissal for regular, temporary and collective dismissal. 
ii) Internet users are measured per 100 persons. 
Data sources: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx) and World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
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Figure 8. Employment protection legislation and broadband penetration, EU countries, 2008 
 
Definitions: i) EPL is a composite measure of employment protection consisting of the strictness of 
regulation and dismissal for regular, temporary and collective dismissal. 
ii) Broadband penetration is measured as the number of broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants. 
Data sources: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx) and Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). 
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relationships in the older EU member states are comparable with those in the new 
member states.  
With regard to TLMs, the original conceptualisation provides a good starting point for 
discussion, but also leaves considerable room for improvement. The concept of the 
TLM model can be developed in more detail when a number of empirical questions are 
answered, which we aim at doing in D6.5. First, some of the underlying factors and 
mechanisms need to be further explained. In the end, transitions are made by 
individuals and the transitions reflect their preferences and decisions. Therefore, these 
decisions need to be made explicit in the models. Moreover, policies regarding labour 
markets result from governments’ decisions related to their preferences and their 
leeway to change the present situation. Again, information about these actors needs to 
be taken into consideration. Taken together, the suggestions made in this paper may 
help to develop the TLM concept in more detail. 
Finally, we have discussed the relationship between EPL, innovation and the adoption 
of new technologies. Understanding the extent to which firms, industries and countries 
are likely to benefit from recent structural reforms introduced in EU countries, 
including product and labour market deregulation, is relevant and important for both 
research and policy-making. For this purpose, we will carry out a more in-depth 
econometric analysis to be delivered in D6.4, to account for other factors related to 
innovation and the adoption of new technologies, including human capital, absorptive 
capacity and the quality of institutions.  
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